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Abstract 
 
Title: Oil Price Shocks Effect on Economic Growth – OPEC versus non-OPEC Economies 
 
 
Subject: Macroeconomics 
 
 
Authors: Hanna Boheman and Josephine Maxén 
 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Pontus Hansson 
 
 
Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to analyse how oil price shocks affect the economic 
growth in net-oil exporting countries. The aim is to conclude whether the economic growth in 
the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is more sensitive to oil price 
shocks than the economic growth in other exporting countries.  
 
 
Method: The data used covers the years 1980 to 2008 and includes 19 (11 OPEC and 8 non-
OPEC) countries’ yearly real gross domestic products and annualised world oil price deflated 
by the all urban consumer price index (USD). In order to reject the presence of unit roots in 
the data, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Im, Pasaran and Shin test were used. The 
included countries were divided into two groups, OPEC and non-OPEC exporting countries, 
from which two separate unrestricted bivariate vector autoregressive models (VARs) were 
constructed. The VARs investigated the response of each group’s combined economic growth 
to oil price shocks. The VARs were analysed through the use of impulse response functions, 
variance decompositions and Granger causality tests. The calculations were made using 
EViews.  
 
 
Results: The outcomes show that a 1% increase in the change of the oil price will increase the 
GDP growth rate the following year with 0.145% (OPEC) versus 0.141% (non-OPEC), 
consequently a positive relationship was found. Moreover, 2.82% of the variation in the 
OPEC countries’ growth rate is explained by oil price shocks, while the responding ratio for 
the non-OPEC countries is 2.81%.  
 
 
Conclusions: OPEC and non-OPEC oil exporting countries’ economic growth illustrated 
nearly identical responses to oil price shocks. Through the discussion it is thereby concluded 
that the price setters, OPEC, appear to be just as sensitive to oil price shocks as non-OPEC 
countries.  
 
 
Keywords: Net-oil Exporters, OPEC, VAR-Model, Oil Price Shocks, Developing Countries, 
Economic Growth  
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1. Introduction  
 
Crude oil is arguably one of the most important commodities in today’s industrialised 
economy, as it represents a crucial energy source for many countries. Its price has been 
subject to various fluctuations throughout time, commencing in the 1970’s when the world 
experienced its first substantial movements in the oil price, and thereby triggering one the 
relationship between oil price and economic growth. At that time, the U.S. was the dominant 
economy in the world, something that inevitably led macroeconomists to examine the 
country’s relation to oil price changes. Along the way, empirical literature started expanding 
its horizons, and economists began studying how oil price movements affected the economic 
growth in other importing countries. A vast quantity of literature has since then explored the 
oil price-GDP relationship, the majority of these focusing on Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries. Relatively few of these studies are applicable 
for oil exporting and developing countries. Moreover, the existing literature on oil exporting 
countries usually merely focuses on a single country’s or on a few countries’ economies. 
There is hardly any literature that examines groups of exporting countries with the intention 
of studying potential discrepancies between them. 
 
For the above-mentioned reasons, the purpose of this thesis is to analyse how oil price shocks 
affect economic growth in 19 net-oil exporting countries during the years 1980-2008. 
Furthermore, the aim is to conclude if the economic growth in Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), compared with the economic growth in other developing oil 
exporting countries, differs in reaction to oil price shocks. OPEC is of specific interest when 
studying the oil price shock-GDP relationship, as it is widely held among economists that 
OPEC plays a key role in affecting the crude oil price as well as being heavily reliant on oil 
revenues for economic development. To our knowledge, no previous econometrical literature 
has studied whether OPEC reacts to oil price shocks differently than other exporting 
countries. Hence, the contribution of this thesis is to shed light on potential differences 
between the groups. This may be of interest to policy makers and investors with a connection 
to oil exporting countries.   
 
In order to pursue this study, the thesis is divided into seven different chapters. Chapter two 
will provide the reader with a theoretical background on the subject by clarifying historic 
price fluctuations, explaining OPEC and its primary aims, as well as describing the current 
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relationship between the oil price and economic growth. The third chapter continues on this 
path and presents previous studies conducted on the relationship between economic growth 
and oil price movements. Next, the data and methodology used are presented, focusing on the 
vector autoregressive model (VAR). Thereafter, the fifth chapter will present the results found 
using the previously stated methods. At the end, the results are discussed, including 
speculations regarding how these outcomes came to be. Lastly, concluding remarks are 
presented.  
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2. Theoretical Background 
 
2.1 Oil price fluctuations 
2.1.1 Historical Path 
Following the Second World War, a massive industrialization took place, and by 1967 oil had 
become the main source of energy in the world. During this period OPEC began to establish 
itself, nevertheless without any pricing power since this power still resided in the hands of 
western transnational oil companies that kept the world oil price relatively stable. (Yan, 2012) 
Despite this, the oil price spiked in  1973 when OPEC decided to impose an oil embargo on 
certain Western European countries and the U.S., due to their support of Israel during the 
Middle Eastern War. As a result, the real crude oil price increased dramatically by 
approximately 260%, resulting in the U.S. imposing a ban on its oil exports and the world 
economy entering a recession. This drastic increase in oil price is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
Through these series of events, OPEC came to realize the power that resided within its oil 
resources, which they could use as an economic and political tool to influence other countries. 
(Kutlu, 2015) 
Figure 2.1: The nominal and real oil price in 2010 U.S. Dollars (USD) 
 
Source: Data from (IFS, 2015) 
 
During the Iranian Revolution in November 1978, the world experienced its second 
significant oil price shock, resulting in an increase of the crude oil price from around 13 to 35 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
5
USD 
Year 
Nominal World
Crude Oil Price
Real World Crude
Oil price (2010
USD)
9 
USD per barrel (IFS, 2015) between the years of 1978 and 1980. Shortly after the revolution, 
the turmoil amplified as the Iran-Iraq War began in September 1980, causing the oil price to 
peak (Yan, 2012). It was only in 1986 that the oil price stabilized to levels seen before the 
Iranian revolution (IFS, 2015). 
A third substantial oil price shock was triggered by the Asian financial crisis in 1997, causing 
a decrease in the global demand for oil. The decreased demand caused the price of world 
crude oil fall from 23 USD per barrel in Q4 1996, to 12 USD per barrel in Q4 1998 (IFS, 
2015). Nevertheless, the world economy recovered once again and crude oil was trading at 
approximately 24 USD per barrel in the end of 1999.  
After 1999, the economy flourished until mid-2008, when the oil price reached its historic 
high at 115 USD per barrel (IFS, 2015). As the financial crisis hit the world economy later 
that same year, the price plummeted to 44 USD per barrel in the beginning of 2009, resulting 
in the fastest crash in oil price history (Kutlu, 2015).  
It took approximately four years for the economies around the world to recover from this 
economic recession, resulting in the world crude oil price reaching 112 USD per barrel by 
2012 (IFS, 2015). Nevertheless, the demand for oil decreased during this time mainly on 
account of a strong dollar and a weak economic growth in Asian and European nations. 
Hence, the world market was slowly being flooded with an excess supply of oil (Yan, 2012). 
In the middle of 2014, the world market experienced yet another oil price shock as prices fell 
from 106 to 51 USD per barrel in the beginning of 2015 (IFS, 2015). This downward trend 
continued as OPEC announced that they were not going to cut their production, in order to not 
decrease their market share. Currently (May, 2015), the world market price for crude oil is 
still wandering around 50 dollars per barrel, and its future remains uncertain.  
 
2.1.2 Influencing factors behind oil price fluctuations 
 
From the historic events presented, the volatile qualities of oil price can be seen clearly. When 
imbalances in global oil supply and demand occur, the price fluctuates. In the following 
section, the primary influential factors that directly or indirectly create imbalances in supply 
and demand are presented.  
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2.1.2.1 Direct Effects 
 
The world’s production capacity 
In accordance with fundamental economics, an increased oil supply leads to a lowering of its 
price. An interesting aspect of oil is that its supply is limited to a certain degree, as it is a non-
renewable resource. Since the beginning of the 1990’s until 2008, no new substantial oil 
fields were found, and no development within transportation and refining occurred. 
Consequently, during this period little improvements were made in the production capacity, 
which was not increasing compared with the pace as the world’s consumption (Zhang, 2008). 
  
Nevertheless, in recent years the discovery of new extraction methods for shale oil 
has significantly changed the oil market. Through the use of fracking and horizontal drilling it 
has become easier to extract oil from albeit known but until recently not economically 
feasible reserves, which has led to a substantial increase in oil supply. (Aguilera & Roderick, 
2013)  
 
The production of OPEC 
The specified amount of oil produced by OPEC countries has been shown to impact the 
world’s oil supply, and thus its price. The member states combined are responsible for 43% of 
the world’s total supply (OPEC, 2014), and they act cohesively by producing oil according to 
certain set policies. Hence, the decisions they make inevitably steer prices in specific 
directions. According to a quantitative analysis by Cheng (2005), the international oil price 
will decrease with 1.23% for every 1% increase of OPEC’s production. In addition, oil price 
has a tendency to rise when there is an uncertainty regarding OPEC’s future production plan, 
as the risk premium improves.  
 
The global economic growth   
Global demand for crude oil directly affects its price, a relationship that can easily be seen by 
analysing historic events. Yan (2012) describes how growth leads to an enlarged demand for 
crude oil that may outperform the supply and result in an increase in the oil price. An example 
of this was when the world experienced rapid development in the beginning of the 21st 
century, mainly as a result of expansions in newly industrialised countries (Yan, 2012). An 
additional example was seen during the financial crisis in the second half of 2008. When the 
world’s economic growth stagnated and the demand of oil did the same, resulting in 
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plummeted prices (IFS, 2015). Hence, one can conclude that there exists a clear link between 
demand and fluctuations in international oil prices. 
 
Change of crude oil inventories 
When the price for oil is low, producers are incentivised to increase their inventories in order 
to drive up the price. Subsequently they can then increase production again when the price has 
risen. Nevertheless, as producers enter the market, prices may be pressed down again. The 
decision regarding when producers decide to extract is explained using more complex 
theories, for example a theory by the economist Harold Hotelling (1931). The Hotelling Rule 
states that extractors act in a profit maximizing way, which leads to an extraction that 
provides no opportunities for intertemporal arbitrage, meaning that countries should be 
indifferent to which time period they extract in. On the other hand, as stated in previous 
sections, this is not always how the industry works in reality. 
 
2.1.2.2 Indirect Effects 
 
Practices in the future market 
Speculations about the future also contribute to disruptions in prices. The price of 
international oil futures works as a benchmark price when evaluating the current price and for 
this reason the spot oil price is highly affected by the opportunistic factors on the future 
market. Lombardi and van Robays (2011) describe how speculations may distort price 
information by causing oil prices to deviate from justified levels and no-arbitrage conditions. 
Agents may adjust their production and consumption policies in accordance with false 
assumptions, which inevitably will affect the oil spot price in the short run. (Lombardi & van 
Robays, 2011)      
 
Dollar Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
In 1974, the oil price was officially linked with the USD, meaning that most international oil 
trades have thereafter invoiced, delivered and settled in USD. Hence, fluctuation in the dollar 
exchange rate has a direct impact on the international oil price as well as oil policies in 
exporting and consuming countries (Yan, 2012). In the event of a USD devaluation, the real 
profits of oil exporting countries would fall, and in order to cope with such an event, OPEC 
would try to raise the price to minimize losses. According to an analysis conducted by Cheng 
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(2005), a 1% increase of the dollar exchange rate makes the price of oil to drop by 3.06% in 
the long run.  
 
Geopolitical turbulence 
Geopolitical risks add a risk premium to the international crude oil price, making the price 
higher. Numerous of the world’s oil reserves are situated in politically troubled areas and 
many of the world’s key oil suppliers are regarded as turbulent countries such as Iran, Iraq, 
Nigeria, Venezuela and Russia. There are both direct and indirect impacts of political and 
social conflicts affecting the oil price. For example, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was a direct 
impact that caused the Iraqi oil production to decrease. Another example of direct impact is 
the commonly seen sabotages of the Nigerian pipelines. Events that have had indirect impacts 
on the oil price are for example the lack of solutions to the conflict between Israel and 
Palestine, and the tension surrounding Iran’s nuclear program (Keppler, 2008). 
 
2.2 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
 
Previously, the policies set by OPEC were mentioned as one of the key influential factors 
behind oil price fluctuations. OPEC was founded in 1960, and today it consists of 12 member 
countries that are considered to be among the lead oil-exporting nations in the world. The 
organization was established by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, and today it 
also comprises Algeria, Angola, Libya, Nigeria, Ecuador, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates 
(Dunsby et al., 2008). OPEC is considered to be an oil cartel even though its primary aim is to 
create a more stable oil market for both consumers and producers. This is accomplished by 
trying to avoid price fluctuations on the market by controlling a substantial share of the total 
supply of crude oil (Dunsby et al., 2008).   
 
2.2.1 Oil Production 
 
OPEC is in control of 43% of the world’s oil production, and it furthermore stands for 81% of 
the world’s proven reserves (OPEC, 2014). Additionally, OPEC states that 60% of the 
exported oil in the world comes from OPEC’s member countries. This considerable market 
share entails that they are able to influence the direction of international crude oil prices 
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through the policies that they set (Kaufmann et al., 2004). For example, the oil production in 
Saudi Arabia particularly affects the world oil price since the country is the largest producer 
within OPEC. 
 
Within OPEC, each member is expected to supply a specific amount of crude oil in 
accordance with a mutually made decision. In order to accomplish this collaboration, the 
member states meet twice a year to discuss the outlook of the petroleum market as well as 
their potential production target. The policies are then set accordingly (OPEC, 2000). Despite 
this, the question remains whether each member abides to the policies set, thus generating the 
desired price and production.  
 
Oil production has become a vital source of income for the OPEC economies, where large 
shares of their total GDP consists of revenues from their crude oil production. A reduction of 
these revenues would lead to a considerable decline of each country's GDP, for example in 
Libya, where today 39% of the GDP stems from oil production (WDI, 2015).  
 
2.2.2 Organizational Structure  
 
In order to create stability and to reach common goals, it is crucial that the cartel consists of a 
cohesive group of countries. OPEC’s ability to influence prices is only as powerful as each 
member’s willingness to oblige to the targeted production. Therefore, countries willing to join 
the organization can do so only if they are considered to be significant net-exporters of oil, 
have similar interests to the other members’, and are considered to be developing countries. A 
majority vote of three-fourths must reside among the members, in addition to acceptance from 
all founding nations (OPEC, 2015). 
 
2.2.3 Economic diversification in OPEC countries 
 
For many years, the economic structure of the OPEC countries has, first and foremost, 
focused on the petroleum industry, as this is their primary source of income. Their heavy 
dependency on oil revenues has prevented these countries’ economies from devoting both 
financial and intellectual capital to the development of other industries (Karl, 2005). Hence, 
many of the OPEC economies have failed to hedge themselves enough against the possibility 
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of a reduced demand for crude oil or a considerable decrease in price. At the moment, many 
OPEC economies are experiencing an economic decline because of the currently low oil 
price, especially Venezuela and Nigeria (Carlson, 2014).  
 
Nevertheless during recent years, member countries have gained increased awareness to their 
dependency on oil. The principal adjustments were made after the financial crisis in 2008, 
when high oil prices enabled the OPEC countries to develop other sectors of their economies. 
(Yan, 2012). Many countries have begun developing their non-oil industries with the 
ambition to expand these sectors’ share of the GDP. A successful economic diversification 
within the OPEC countries would enable the economies to grow despite potential fluctuations 
in oil price. 
 
2.3 Economic Growth and Oil Price Fluctuations in Oil Exporting 
Countries  
 
Crude oil is a crucial commodity for both importing and exporting nations, as it is either an 
important input factor or source of income. A rise or fall in price is therefore of interest to 
these economies and can affect various macroeconomic variables, such as economic growth.  
 
The prevailing view among economists is than an increase in oil price, ceteris paribus, tends 
to have a positive effect on oil exporting countries. This is based on the idea that a boost in oil 
price, generates a change in terms of trade as income is transferred from importing to 
exporting nations, resulting in an increased national income. Following a price rise, the 
exporting economies potential gains are however diminished because of the decreased 
demand for oil from importing economies. This series of events is depicted in historic 
occurrences, for example during the price shock in 1984 when oil prices increased 
substantially, decreasing the demand from importing countries that later entered economic 
recessions (Pindyck, 1991).  
 
On the other hand, changes in oil price might not always be considered to be positive for 
exporting countries, even when they lead to a higher price. Large fluctuations entail increased 
uncertainty, often leading to diminished incentives for investment. Moreover, it becomes 
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more challenging for these economies to plan ahead, and they may become subject to costly 
reallocation of resources (Bernanke, 1983). 
 
It is important to note that there is a difference in studying the relationship between oil price 
volatility and GDP growth compared to the relationship between the oil price shock and GDP 
growth. The former aims to investigate how countries’ economic growth reacts during times 
of price uncertainty, while the latter, questioned in this thesis, examines how economic 
growth reacts when a sudden increase in the yearly percentage change of oil price occurs.  
 
Countries dependency on oil exports is inevitably crucial when studying how different 
economies react oil price shocks. Many of the world’s net-exporters suffer from what is 
referred to as the ”resource curse” or “Dutch disease”. These terms were coined to depict the 
negative relation found between a heavy reliance on natural resources and economic growth. 
Countries with vast natural resources, such as oil, tend to develop their markets through 
revenues gained from producing this resource (Karl, 2005). Oil exports lead to an inflow of 
foreign currency, which increases demand for the exporting country’s currency, making it 
appreciate. This makes the country’s other products less price competitive on the export 
market leading to a tendency to further invest in the competitive export sector, i.e. the oil 
sector. On account of this, a highly developed oil sector increases wages, thus increasing 
wages in other industries as well, further lowering these sectors competitiveness (Karl, 2005). 
Therefore, economies suffering from the “resource curse” inevitably experience huge income 
losses in the event of a decreased oil price. Because of the high volatility of oil price, other 
industries should be considered in order to hedge the country’s economic growth.  
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3. Previous Research  
 
 
Crude oil is of great importance to the world’s economy, as it is an important source of 
income and input factor for many countries. Therefore it is not surprising that price 
fluctuations and its impacts on growth has been widely studied among economists.  
 
The first strand of literature written on the subject of oil-price-GDP relationship, focuses 
mainly on the U.S. economy. In 1983, Hamilton found that most of the post-World War II 
recessions in the U.S. could be explained by oil price increases. This relationship was found 
through Granger causality tests, and thus concluding that there was a link between the U.S. 
GDP and oil price. This connection was later confirmed by Burbridge and Harrison (1984), 
Gisser and Goodwin (1986) as well as Ferderer (1996), among others. Mork (1989) 
established that an increase in the price of crude oil had a negative effect on U.S. production, 
and that a decline in oil price showed no statistically significant effects, indicating an 
asymmetric relationship. This was later verified by Hamilton (2003).  
 
The second strand of literature considering the relationship between oil price movements and 
GDP, widened the previous perspective by including other developed countries in addition to 
the U.S., the majority of these being net importers of oil. Examples of such studies are Mork 
et al. (1994), Papapetrou (2001), Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sanchez (2005) and Lardic and 
Mignon (2006). These empirical studies included large OECD economies, and in most cases 
determined a negative relationship between oil price and GDP. Moreover, through the use of a 
multivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis, Jiménez-Rodriguez and Sánchez (2005) 
found that oil price increases have an impact on GDP growth, whereas declines do not. 
Hence, confirming the existence of an asymmetric relationship, earlier found by Mork (1989) 
and Hamilton (2003).  
 
In more recent years, Rentschler (2013) examined the significance of oil price volatility in a 
number of countries, including developed, developing, importing and exporting countries. 
These include Germany, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and the United States. 
Using a VAR, Rentchler’s paper concludes that an increase in oil price volatility can have 
negative consequences for the economies of both oil exporting and importing countries. He 
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also states that an economy that greatly depends on oil trade is more likely to be affected by 
price shocks. 
As for developing countries, fewer empirical studies exists. Berument, Ceylan and Dogan 
(2010) examined how oil price shocks affect the output growth in some net-exporting and net-
importing countries in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) region, with the GDP 
figures ranging from 1952-2005. They suggest that oil price shocks have a significantly 
positive effect on the outputs of Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Syria and 
United Arab Emirates, of which the majority are OPEC countries, except Oman and Syria. 
Meanwhile, oil-price shocks showed no impact on the outputs of Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, all of which are net-importers. They also acknowledged 
the existence of an asymmetrical relationship between GDP and oil price. Similar results were 
also presented by Dées et al. (2005), and Medoza and Vera (2010).  
 
Furthermore, Mehrara and Oskoui (2007) examined output fluctuations in Iran, Kuwait, 
Indonesia and Saudi Arabia (all OPEC members at the time), and aimed to conclude the 
driving forces behind output fluctuations. By imposing long-run restrictions on a VAR-model, 
four structural shocks were identified: nominal demand, real demand, supply, and oil price 
shocks. Oil price shocks were identified as the main driving force behind fluctuations in GDP 
in Saudi Arabia and Iran, while supply shocks had the biggest impact in Kuwait and 
Indonesia. The authors believe Kuwait’s well-managed savings fund and Indonesia’s limited 
resource-based production to be the reasons for these results. 
 
Noticeably, numerous studies have been conducted on the subject, where the economic effects 
of an oil price increase, correspondingly decrease, have been examined. These studies have 
tended to focus more on developed oil importing countries and have in many cases concluded 
that the result of a price increase affects GDP and other macroeconomic indicators negatively. 
This paper will focus more on developing net-exporting countries, as there is a missing gap in 
published research for this. More specifically it will discuss whether oil price shocks has a 
greater effect on OPEC countries’ economic growth than on similar non-OPEC countries, 
using the popularly used VAR-model in order to portray the relation between the two.  
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4. Methodology and Data  
 
4.1 Data  
 
Selection of Countries  
The objective is to investigate if economic growth in 11 OPEC countries is more sensitive to 
oil price shocks compared to 8 other net oil-exporting countries, during the period of 1980-
2008. All OPEC members are considered to be developing countries, hence all the selected 
non-OPEC countries are also developing (ISI, 2015), this is to make the groups comparable. 
In order to justify the comparison further, all countries included in the study have average oil 
revenues that account for at least 10%, and no more than 45%
1
 of the countries GDPs. To 
confirm that the countries have been highly dependent on oil rents
2
 during the entire relevant 
time frame, their average oil revenue, as a percentage of GDP, are calculated for the time span 
1980-2008. The original data series (oil rents % of GDP) are obtained from the World Bank, 
World Development Indicators (WDI, 2015), from which an average is determined. See Table 
4.1. 
 
Table 4.1  
OPEC 
Countries  
Time Span  Average oil 
rent (% of 
GDP) 
Non-OPEC 
Countries  
Time Span  Average oil 
rent (% of 
GDP)  
Algeria 1980-2013 18.8 Azerbaijan 1990-2013 29.6 
Angola  1985-2013 44.2 Brunei 1980-2013 29.3 
Ecuador  1980-2013 12.9 Chad 1980-2013 31.6 
Iran 1980-2013* 21.7 Gabon 1980-2013 39.7 
Kuwait 1980-2013 44.2 Kazakhstan  1990-2013 24.0 
Libya 1990-2013 40.7 Oman  1980-2013 35.8 
Nigeria 1980-2013 33.0 Russia 1989-2013 13.0 
Saudi Arabia 1980-2013 40.4 Yemen 1990-2013 28.2 
UAE** 1980-2013 22.4    
Venezuela 1980-2013 24.8    
Qatar 1980-2013 33.9    
Average  30.6%   28.9% 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Yemen, Azerbaijan, Angola and Libya, differ in the covered years because they lack data 
due to certain political and regional tensions. *Interpolation for 1991 & 1992, **United Arab Emirates  
 
 
                                                 
1 We wanted the group of countries to have the relatively same dependence on oil rents, therefore, 
countries with substantially different average oil rents were not included, for example Congo, Rep.   
2 The difference between the value of produced crude oil at world prices and total costs of production  
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Thus, the focus is on developing net oil exporting countries that are heavily reliant on 
revenues from oil. The non-OPEC countries included in this study are chosen based on this 
rationale, resulting in a selection of 8 countries: Azerbaijan, Brunei, Chad, Gabon, 
Kazakhstan, Oman, Russia and Yemen. Additionally two more countries were considered, 
Equatorial Guinea and Turkmenistan, nevertheless, they were ultimately not included as they 
lacked sufficient data. Regarding the OPEC countries, 11 out of the 12 members are included, 
namely: Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and 
Venezuela. Iraq, one of the member countries of OPEC, lacked data from 1991 until 2003, 
and was therefore eliminated. See Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1  
 
 
                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Included OPEC countries   Included non-OPEC countries        
 
In the econometric analysis, the countries are divided into two groups. The average oil 
revenues (% of GDP) are then calculated for each group in order to see if these are relatively 
similar, and thus comparable. The values for both groups are displayed in Table 4.1 and show 
similar levels of dependency. 
 
Economic Growth  
Concerning a measure for economic growth, the differentiated natural logarithm of real GDP 
is used as a proxy. The reason behind choosing real GDP was to generate an accurate 
relationship between the variables, independent from price changes.   
 
A large number of previous studies have used quarterly data (see: Jimenez-Rodriguez and 
Sanchez, 2008) to illustrate the effects of sudden changes in oil price on growth rate, but since 
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the majority of the countries included in this particular study lacked quarterly information of 
GDP, yearly data was used. The countries’ yearly real GDPs are obtained from the World 
Bank, World Development Index (WDI, 2015), and ranged from 1980-2013. This timespan 
varies between the selected countries depending on availability of data, as illustrated in Table 
4.1.  
 
Oil Price Shock  
The figures for world crude oil price are obtained from the International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2015), and consist of a yearly average of the world 
crude oil price. These were then deflated though the use of the all urban Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) gathered from Bureau Labor Statistics (BLS, 2015). These were also logged with 
the natural logarithm and differentiated in order to portray the change in oil price, see Figure 
4.2. In this way, an oil price shock is in the VAR represented as an increase in the yearly 
percentage change in the oil price.   
 
Figure 4.2  
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Source: Authors own calculations, based on IFS (2015) 
 
Time Period 
The timespan of 1980 to 2008 is chosen largely because there was little data to be found on 
the individual countries’ GDP before 1980, problematizing the execution of an econometrical 
study before this date. Moreover, it is apparent from Figure 4.2, that the oil price has been 
very volatile after 2008, an aspect that might lead to the vector autoregressive (VAR) model 
assuming a false relationship between the oil price and economic growth for years after 2008. 
Therefore, data covering the years 2009-2013 was excluded, which hopefully will 
demonstrate a more accurate relationship between the variables.  
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In summary, the analysis consists of a total of 19 countries, 11 OPEC and 8 non-OPEC, all of 
which are developing nations that are dependent on oil production revenues. Furthermore, our 
proxy for oil price shocks is represented through changes in world oil price, and economic 
growth which is represented through changes in logged real GDP.  
 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Econometric Overview 
 
In this econometric analysis a vector autoregressive model (VAR) is used to examine the 
behavioural relationship between oil prices shocks and the economic growth in the two 
groups of countries. To be able to compare the sensitivity between the two groups, two 
separate VAR-models for the OPEC countries and non-OPEC countries are used. To further 
deepen the analysis of the VARs, the Granger causality, impulse response functions and 
variance decompositions are examined.  
 
In order to be able to use the VAR, all data must be tested to see if they contain a unit root. 
This is accomplished through an augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test and an Im, Pesaran 
and Shin (IPS) test.  
 
4.2.2 Unit Root Test  
 
Time series containing unit roots are supposed to not be stationary.  Non-stationary series 
leads to statistically spurious relationships, meaning that accurate conclusions cannot be 
drawn from the data as it includes means and variances that are not constant over time. 
Moreover, the persistence of for example an oil price shock will be infinite for a non-
stationary series. Therefore, a VAR cannot be constructed if the data contains unit roots. In 
order to test the null hypothesis, that there is a presence of unit roots in the data, the ADF and 
IPS tests were used.  
 
The ADF test is used when trying to find unit roots in a time series. It presents different 
results depending on if the time series is assumed to have a time-trend and/or an intercept. A 
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time-trend should be included in the model if a long-term incline or decline exists in the data, 
which can easily be discovered by observing a graph of the data. Moreover, an intercept needs 
to be included if the mean of the series is far from zero (Verbeek, 2008) 
 
When considering a model with 2 lags (AR(2)) where both time-trend and intercept are 
included, the equation used for the ADF  is constructed as following: 
 
𝒚𝒕 =  𝝁 +  𝜷𝒕 +  𝜸𝒚𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜸𝟏∆𝒚𝒕−𝟏  +  𝜸𝟐∆𝒚𝒕−𝟐 + 𝜺𝒕       (1) 
 
𝛍  =  Intercept, 𝛃 = time trend.  
 
The unit root test is carried out under the null hypothesis that all 𝜸i = 0, if this hypothesis is 
rejected (i.e. 𝜸i < 0). This means that the presence of a unit root can be rejected.  (Verbeek, 
2008) 
 
Since the samples of the two groups’ GDP growths are in panel, a unit root test applicable on 
panel data has to be used for these variables. This is done by using the Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(IPS) test (2003). The IPS test is based on the ADF test by creating an average from the ADF 
statistics, across the groups. Similar to the ADF test, the IPS is constructed with time-trend 
and/or an intercept, depending on the qualities of the data. The null hypothesis of the IPS test 
is that all series in the panel has a unit root, whilst the alternative hypothesis is that some 
individual series have unit roots and others do not.  
 
4.2.3 Cointegration test 
 
If the unit root tests determine some of the data to be non-stationary, the Johansen (1990) test 
for cointegration will be used on this data. Two non-stationary time series are said to be 
cointegrated if the linear combination of them is stationary. In order to use the Johansen test, 
the VAR will need to be turned into a vector error correction model, from which the number 
of cointegrating vectors can be determined. (Brooks, 2008)   
 
23 
As it turns out, the unit roots tests conclude that all of the variables are stationary. Hence, no 
cointegration test will be necessary and an unrestricted VAR on both the OPEC and non-
OPEC group can be executed.  
4.2.4 Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) 
 
Mentioned in the preceding sub-section, the response of GDP to oil price shocks is analysed 
through the use of an unrestricted bivariate VAR. To be able to compare the sensitivity 
between OPEC and non-OPEC countries, two separate VAR-models are constructed for the 
groups. This model was first advocated by Sims (1980), and has today become popular 
among economists for studies like these as it is a relatively easy model to use when analysing 
multivariate time series (Luetkepohl, 2011). The variables treated in the VAR-model are all 
seen as endogenous, with no imposed structural relationships or restrictions. Verbeek (2008) 
describes the framework behind a first-order VAR as following:  
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛿1 + 𝜃11𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜃12𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑌𝑡                                    (2)                                
and 
 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝛿2 + 𝜃21𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜃22𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑋𝑡                                     (3) 
 
where 𝜀𝑌𝑡 and 𝜀𝑋𝑡 are independent of the lags of Y and X and denote white noise. Verbeek 
continues by stating that if the coefficient 𝜃12 is not equal to zero, then this means that the 
lagged values of X help explain Y (2008). In other words, the VAR coefficients help clarify 
the extent of the relationship.  
 
Through a multivariate framework, this model captures how changes in a particular variable 
are related to changes in its own lags, as well as to changes in other variables and their lags. 
Therefore, before implementing a VAR, the optimal lag length need to be determined.   
 
Lag length selection 
There are numerous methods that can be utilised to select the appropriate numbers of lags. 
Two approaches are of main focus here: firstly, the lag exclusion Wald test is employed, 
followed by the traditional lag order selection information criteria procedure. The Wald test 
works by testing the null hypothesis that the variables in the VAR are jointly zero at a given 
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lag. Where the null hypothesis is rejected, the test indicates that the lag should be included. 
Turning to the lag order selection criteria, it proposes the optimal lag according to different 
recognised methods. Two of the most commonly used information criteria are Akaike 
information criteria (AIC) and Schwartz information criteria (SIC) (Verbeek, 2008). These 
two propose the optimal number of lags according to their calculations, which thereafter are 
compared in order to choose the optimum lag length for the series. The optimal lag is often 
chosen based on reasonable thinking; in other words, when deciding which of the optimal lags 
presented to choose, AIC or SIC, the one that is most likely to capture the real relationship in 
the model is selected. In addition, Verbeek (2008) explains that in most cases, the AIC or SIC 
with the smallest value is preferred.  
 
Ordering of variables 
When constructing a VAR, the ordering of the variables is important as it may affect the 
results. When one of the variables in the VAR is struck by a shock, the model assumes that 
the other variables also will be affected. To which extent this is true, depends on the level of 
correlation between the residuals (Brooks, 2008). For this reason, it is important to assume an 
ordering, so that a potential impulse to the system affects the variables in the right direction. 
Moreover, the ordering has to correspond to the mathematics chosen behind the VAR. In this 
thesis, the equations within the VAR are analysed through a matrix called Cholesky 
decomposition (Kilian, 2011). To follow the qualities of this matrix, the variable selected first 
should be the one with the most potential immediate impact on the other variable following a 
shock in its residuals (Kilian, 2011). In the VAR used, the growth rate is ordered first, 
followed by the oil price change. The motive behind the chosen order is that a shock in 
growth is assumed to have an immediate impact on the change in oil price, whilst a shock in 
the oil price would not have an immediate impact on the growth rate, as a country’s GDP 
have a tendency to change slowly.   
 
After having implemented the VARs, the analysis is continued through the use of Granger 
causality tests, Impulse Response Functions and Variance Decompositions. 
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4.2.4.1 Granger Causality Test 
 
A Granger causality test is a formal way to assess whether one variable has a tendency to 
succeed another. X is said to granger cause Y if X is useful in forecasting Y. This implies that 
X granger causes Y, if historical values of X are able to increase the accuracy of the 
prediction of the present Y. Granger causality differs from normal causality in that if X is said 
to granger cause Y, this does not mean that X will lead to Y. Instead this implies that 
historically, when X occurs, Y has followed. Granger causality test uses an F-test to see 
whether lagged information on variable Y provides statistically significant information about 
variable X, as seen in Equation 3, or whether lagged information on variable X provides 
statistically significant information about variable Y (Equation 4):   
 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑡−1 +. . . + 𝛼𝑚𝑋𝑡−𝑚 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑡−1 +. . . + 𝛽𝑚𝑦𝑡−𝑚 + 𝜀𝑋𝑡           (4)  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑌𝑡−1 +. . . + 𝛼𝑚𝑌𝑡−𝑚 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑡−1 +. . . + 𝛽𝑚𝑥𝑡−𝑚 + 𝜀𝑌𝑡           (5)  
 
H0: if all βi = 0 = no granger causality 
H1: βi ≠ 0 = granger causality exists  
 
4.2.4.2 Impulse Response Function (IRF) 
 
The IRF is a complement to the Granger causality test and an extension to the VAR. It 
provides information about the timing as well as the extent of the relationship between 
variables. The IRF captures the responsiveness of endogenous variables to a shock in each of 
the variables included in the VAR (Brooks, 2008). More precisely, the IRF shows how and 
for how many subsequent time periods, one standard deviation shock in one variable’s 
residuals affects the other variables, and for how long the shock has an effect on the variables.  
 
To increase understanding for this model, an example is presented through the use of the 
following equation:   
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛿1 + 𝜃1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜃2𝑌𝑡−2 + 𝜀𝑌𝑡       (6)                 
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Suppose that a shock occurs in the residua l𝜀𝑌𝑡−1, the 𝑌𝑡−1 will then change according to the 
equation. Due to lags in the model, the changed 𝑌𝑡−1 will affect 𝑌𝑡, even if the shock occurred 
in the previous period’s residual. Consequently, the impulse response function expresses for 
how many periods a shock in 𝜀𝑌𝑡 has an effect, meaning that it determines how many periods 
it takes until Y returns to equilibrium. (Greene, 2003) 
 
Moreover, an IRF depicts if the relationship is negative or positive (Brooks, 2008). After 
conducting this test, the statistical reliability of the IRF has to be assessed. This is 
accomplished by analysing whether the two standard error bands framing the function, cover 
the zero or not.  
 
The results of the IRF are of interest, as they can illustrate if there are any differences between 
how the two groups’ economies react to an oil price shock.  
 
4.2.4.3 Variance Decomposition  
The variance decomposition is an extension of the VAR and determines how much of the 
movements in one variable can be explained by its own shocks versus exogenous shocks to 
the other variables. According to the method, a shock in one variable will inevitably affect 
that variable, but through the dynamic structure of the VAR, it will also be transmitted to all 
of the other variables in the system (Brooks, 2008). As previously mentioned, the ordering of 
the variables is important for calculating variance decompositions.  
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5. Results  
 
In this chapter we implement a VAR in order to examine the relationship between oil price 
and GDP. The results for each step are presented below.   
5.1 Unit Root Test    
The data examined by the ADF test, consists of the differentiated logged real world crude oil 
price. The estimated lag lengths used are obtained by the Schwarz information criteria. When 
testing the presence of a unit root in oil price neither time-trend nor intercept were included. 
This specification was chosen since it has the highest statistical significance among the 
available specifications. Additionally it has a Durbin-Watson value near 2 that indicates that 
there is no autocorrelation among residuals. The ADF test found no unit roots in the 
investigated data, and consequently determined the differentiated oil price to be stationary.  
 
Regarding the panel data consisting of the OPEC and non-OPEC countries’ differentiated 
logged real GDP, the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) test was used to test for unit roots. The IPS 
determined that both time-trend and intercept should be included, as this specification rejected 
presence of unit roots in both the OPEC and non-OPEC sample.    
 
The variables tested in the ADF and IPS were in first difference and through the tests 
determined to be stationary. Therefore it was concluded that second order differentiating was 
not necessary in order to make the variables stationary; first order differentiation was 
sufficient. The results from the unit root tests are presented in Table 5.1 and 5.2 in the 
appendix. 
 
5.2 Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR)  
 
Lag length selection 
The lag exclusion Wald test showed that two lags were statistically significant for all 
variables. Furthermore, the Akaike information criteria (AIC) suggested 8 lags for both 
models while Schwartz information criteria (SIC) suggested 2 lags for the OPEC and 5 for the 
non-OPEC. It is not reasonable to believe that an oil price shock would affect the economy 
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for 8 or 5 years, therefore 2 lags were chosen in accordance with Wald, and additionally with 
SIC for OPEC.  
 
The bivariate VAR used is consequently denoted as following:  
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝛿1 + 𝜃11𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜃12𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜃11𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2 + 𝜃12𝑂𝑃𝑡−2 + 𝜀𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡     (5) 
and 
𝑂𝑃𝑡 = 𝛿2 + 𝜃21𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜃22𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜃21𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜃22𝑂𝑃𝑡−2 + 𝜀𝑂𝑃𝑡         (6) 
 
OP = change in oil price 
GDP = economic growth  
 
The option to rearrange the bivariate model into a multivariate model was not desirable as the 
objective was to isolate the effect of oil price changes on economic growth. Moreover, 
including additional influencing factors could reduce the precision of the VAR and potentially 
generate misleading results.  
 
The results from both VAR-estimations can be found in Table 5.3 and 5.4 and are explained 
below. Being crucial for this study, a particular focus is set on exploring whether the 
coefficients explaining how the lagged change in oil price (DLRWOP -1, -2) affect the 
current GDP growth rate (DLRGDP). 
 
Regarding the OPEC countries, the results indicate that if the change in oil price increases 
with 1%, then the GDP growth rate will increase with 0.145% the following year. Moreover, 
the coefficient for how a change in the previous year GDP growth rate affects the change oil 
price, implies that a 1%, increase in real GDP growth rate leads to approximately a 0.21% 
increase in the change in oil price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
Table 5.3 Vector Autoregression (VAR) Estimates, OPEC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Critical values: -1.96, 1.96 (two-tailed), significant values in bold 
 
 
From the non-OPEC VAR below, the estimates note that a 1% increase in change in oil price 
will increase the GDP growth rate with 0.142%. 
 
Table 5.4 Vector Autoregression (VAR) Estimates, non-OPEC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Critical values: -1.96, 1.96 (two-tailed), significant values in bold 
 
 
Earlier the decision was made to exclude data from 2009 to 2013. In order to see what the 
relationship would have looked like between 1980 and 2013, a VAR was implemented, and 
1980-2008  
 DLRGDP DLRWOP 
DLRGDP (-1) 0.1682 0.2071 
t-statistics 2.4588 2.2140 
   
DLRGDP (-2) 0.0645 0.1658 
t-statistics 0.9714 1.8275 
   
DLRWOP (-1) 0.145 -0.0665 
t-statistics 2.8817 -0.9669 
   
DLRWOP (-2) 0.0156 -0.0949 
t-statistics 0.3127 -1.3935 
   
R
2           0,1045 
1980-2008  
 DLRGDP DLRWOP 
DLRGDP (-1) 0.3561 0.1123 
t-statistics 4.0124 0.7897 
   
DLRGDP (-2) 0.1291 0.2425 
t-statistics 1.5583 1.8259 
   
DLRWOP (-1) 0.1418 0.0220 
t-statistics 2.4690 0.2385 
   
DLRWOP (-2) -0.0637 -0.1932 
t-statistics -1.1223 -2.1226 
   
R
2          0.2705 
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insignificant and weak results were found. These results can be seen in the appendix in Table 
5.5. 
 
To further increase the understanding of a sudden change in yearly oil price and economic 
growth, the results from the Granger causality test, the impulse response function and 
variance decomposition are presented. All of these tests are extensions from the existing 
VAR- model. 
 
5.2.1 Granger Causality Test 
 
The upshots from the Granger causality test are presented below and can be found in Table 
5.6 in the appendix.  
 
For the given time frame, a two-way causality is found in both OPEC and non-OPEC 
economies. At a 5% level of significance, oil price shocks granger cause the growth rate of 
the OPEC countries as well as the non-OPEC countries. In addition, at 5% significance level, 
the growth rate in OPEC granger cause oil price shocks, and in non-OPEC countries the 
growth rate granger causes oil price shocks at a 10% level of significance.  
 
5.2.2 Impulse Response Function (IRF) 
 
The results of the IRFs depict how one standard deviation shock in the change in oil price, 
affects the OPEC and non-OPEC economies respectively, and if they differ in any aspects.  
 
In accordance with the VAR-model, significant results were found for the first period after an 
oil price shock for both OPEC and non-OPEC countries during 1980-2008. The upshots show 
similar responses across the groups, illustrating that economic growth reacts positively one 
year after the shock. During the second year, both groups’ reaction functions diminish to 
levels seen before the oil shock. Furthermore, the non-OPEC reaction function declines 
steeper reaching negative levels. Nevertheless, none of the results in the second period are 
significant.      
 
Figure 5.1: Impulse Response Functions  
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5.2.3 Variance Decomposition 
 
The outcomes from the variance decomposition tests can be found in Table 5.7 and 5.8 in the 
appendix. Neither group’s variation in growth rate can be explained by an oil price shock in 
the same period as the shock occurs. In the following period, a shock in oil price accounts for 
2.82% (OPEC) and 2.81% (non-OPEC) of variation in growth rate. Noticeably, these results 
do not differ substantially from the results presented in the VAR, as the values for each group 
are practically identical. 
 
5.3 Results summary 
The VAR exhibited that a 1% increase in the change of the oil price will increase the GDP 
growth rate the following year with 0.145% (OPEC) versus 0.142% (non-OPEC). Moreover, 
2.82 % of the variation in the OPEC countries’ growth rate is explained by oil shocks, while 
the responding ratio for the non-OPEC countries is 2.81%. The results from the VARs and 
IRFs depict that a positive relationship reside between oil price shocks and economic growth, 
a relationship only found to be significant one year after the shock occurs.   
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6. Discussion  
 
Through the use of various econometrical methods, the economies of OPEC and non-OPEC 
countries showed equivalent responses after an oil price shock. There are several potential 
reasons for why changes in oil price have similar impacts on the economic growth in OPEC 
and non-OPEC countries. First of all, as previously taken into consideration in this thesis, the 
two compared groups are alike in numerous aspects. They consist of developing countries that 
are highly dependent on oil revenues, thus it is reasonable to assume that the two groups will 
react in a similar manner to oil price shocks. Consequently, it is likely to assume that the 
policies set by OPEC that aims to create a stable oil market and thus stable growth within 
their member countries, are also desirable for the non-OPEC economies. According to these 
assumptions, an increase in the change of oil price could affect the countries’ GDP in a 
similar manner. The question that remains is why non-OPEC countries have chosen not to 
become members of OPEC, given their mutual interests.            
 
Firstly, non-OPEC countries may benefit from the decisions made by OPEC, independent 
from whether they are members or not (Falola & Genova, 2005). Through this, they are able 
to savour the benefits from OPEC’s work, as “free riders”, and at the same time not have to 
adhere to decided production levels. This is, on the other hand, only beneficial if OPEC is 
strong enough to maintain prices at an elevated level. For example, if the non-OPEC countries 
decide to keep a high level of supply, this makes it difficult for OPEC to maintain control 
over oil prices. An additional advantage for remaining outside of OPEC, may be the 
instability associated with the organization, a reputation gained through various regional 
conflicts among the Middle Eastern economies.  
 
An equally interesting finding is the positive relationship between oil price shocks and 
economic growth. The observed relationship could stem from an asymmetric relationship 
between oil price shocks and economic growth mentioned in previous empirical literature 
(see: Berument, Ceylan & Dogan, 2010, Medoza & Vera, 2010, Jimenez-Rodriguez & 
Sanchez, 2005, and Mork, 1989). In these studies it was noted that an increase in oil price 
affects output more than a decrease does. Furthermore, the general view among economists is 
that oil-exporting countries’ economic growth is positively (negatively) affected by an 
increase (decrease) in oil price. Therefore it would be feasible to believe, given the existence 
33 
of an asymmetric relationship, that the net-effect of a sudden change in prices would be 
positive. 
 
6.1 Further Research  
 
The main focus has been on the time frame 1980-2008 because of the presumed inexplicable 
variability in data following this time period. Even though a drastic change in oil price after 
2008 can be observed, no econometric test was used to strengthen the assumption used in this 
thesis. This could be accomplished by for example testing for structural breaks through the 
Chow test. A structural break is an abrupt change in a time series, and by knowing its 
existence and when it occurs, an increased understanding can be gained about the data. 
Furthermore, time will tell whether the insignificant relationship found during 1980-2013 is 
permanent or only a temporary deviation caused by the financial crisis in 2008. Therefore, it 
would be of great interest to conduct a similar study in the future when the world economies 
have fully recovered from the large fluctuations in oil price that have occurred after 2008.  
 
Another aspect that is worth to investigate further is the bivariate approach taken in this 
thesis. It could be of interest to see if a multivariate framework would capture any additional 
aspects of the oil price shock-GDP growth relationship. Variables that could be of interest to 
include could for example be exchange rates or interest rates.  
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7. Conclusion  
 
This thesis sought to analyse if there is a difference in how the economic growth, in 11 OPEC 
and 8 non-OPEC oil producing economies, react to sudden changes in oil price. The analysis 
was accomplished through an unrestricted bivariate VAR-model and covered the period 1980 
to 2008. Moreover, the objective was to fill an existing gap in empirical literature, as there is 
insufficient research on the effect of an oil price shock on the economic growth in developing 
oil producing countries, and none that compare OPEC with non-OPEC countries. From the 
results, the following conclusions could be drawn: firstly, that OPEC, the price setters, and 
non-OPEC economies are equally sensitive to oil price shocks. Secondly, that the relationship 
between oil price shocks and economic growth is positive for developing oil exporting 
countries. 
 
We believe that an analysis similar to the one seen in this thesis is of future interest. Many of 
the underlying circumstances will change in the near future, for example the oil price, the 
world’s oil inventories, the number of developed countries in the world, and consequently the 
world’s demand. A small change to any of these could potentially lead to dramatically 
different conclusions. 
 
  
35 
References  
 
Aguilera, R. F. and Roderick, M. (2013) Shale Gas and Oil: Fundamentally Changing Global 
Energy Markets. Oil and Gas Journal. 
 
Bernanke, B. S. (1983) Non-Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of 
the Great Depression. NBER Working Paper Series no. 1054. Available at: 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w1054.pdf  
 
Berument, M. H., Ceylan, N. B. and Dogan, N. (2010) The Impact of Oil Price Shocks on the 
Economic Growth of Selected MENA Countries. The Energy Journal. 31(1), pp. 
149-175.  
 
Brooks, C. (2008) Introductory Econometrics for Finance. 2nd Edition. United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Burbridge, J. and Harrison, A. (1984) Testing For the Effects of Oil Price Rises Using Vector 
Autoregression. International Economic Review. 25, pp.459-484.  
 
Carlson, D. (2014) Collapse of Oil Prices leads World Economy into Trouble [online ] . The 
Guardian. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/dec/03/oil-
collapse-leads-world-economy-trouble  
 
Cheng, W. L. (2005) Quantitative Analysis of Influencing Factors of International Oil Price. 
International Petroleum Economics. 8, p 20. 
 
Dées, S., Karadeloglou, P., Kaufmann R. K., Sánchez, M. (2007) Modelling the World Oil 
Market: Assessment of a Quarterly Econometric Model. Energy Policy. 35(1), 
pp. 178-191.   
 
Dunsby, A., Eckstein, J., Gaspar, J. and Mulholland S. (2008) Commodity Investing: 
Maximizing Returns through Fundamental Analysis.1
st
 edition. New Jersey: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
Falola, T. and Genova, A. (2005) The Politics of the Global Oil Industry: An Introduction. (1
st
 
Edition) West Port: Praeger Publishers. 
 
Ferderer, J. P. (1996) Oil Price Volatility and the Macroeconomy. Journal of 
Macroeconomics. 18, pp. 1-26 
 
Gisser, M. and Goodwin, T. H. (1986) Crude Oil and the Macroeconomy: Test of Some 
Popular Notions: Note. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 18, pp.95-103.  
 
Greene, W. H. (2003) Econometrical Analysis. (5
th
 Edition) New Jersey: Pearson Education, 
Inc. 
 
 
Hamilton, J. D. (1983) Oil and the Macroeconomy Since World War II. Journal of Political 
Economy. 91, pp.228-248.  
 
36 
Hamilton, J.D. (2003) What is an Oil Shock. Journal of Econometrics. 113, pp. 363-398.  
 
Hotelling, H. (1931) The Economics of Exhaustible Resources. The Journal of Political 
Economy. 39 (2), pp.137-175 Available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1822328.pdf?acceptTC=true  
 
Im, K., M.H. Pesaran and Y. Shin (2003) Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels. 
Journal of Econometric. 115, pp.53-74. 
 
Jiménez-Rodriguez, R. and Sánchez, M. (2005) Oil Price Shocks and Real GDP Growth 
Empirical Evidence from Some OECD Countries. Applied Economics. 37, pp. 
201-228.  
 
Jiménez-Rodriguez, R. (2008) The Industrial Impact of Oil Price Shocks: Evidence from the 
Industries of six OECD countries. Energy Economics. 30(6), pp.3095-3108. 
 
Karl, T. L. (2005) Understanding the Resource Curse. IN: Tsalik, S. and Schiffrin, A. (Eds.) 
Covering Oil: A Reporter’s Guide to Energy and Development. New York: 
Open Society Institute. pp. 21-26  
 
Kaufmann, R. K., Dées, S., Karadeloglou, P., and Sánchez, M. (2004) Does OPEC matter? 
An Econometric Analysis of Oil Prices. The Energy Journal. 25(4), pp.67-90.  
 
Keppler, J. H. (2007) International Relations and Security of Energy Supply: Risk to 
Continuity and Geopolitical Risks. European Parliament: Policy Department 
External Policies. Report number: 43. Available at: 
http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/200/keppler_55.P
DF;jsessionid=F9D83FFFB53D626B0DA5FDA52B3FCDF2?sequence=1  
 
Kilian, L. (2011) Structural Vector Autoregressions. CEPR Discussion Papers 8515, C.E.P.R. 
Discussion Papers.  
 
Kutlu, O. (2015) Wars, crises, global economy drive oil prices in history.  Journal of Turkish 
Weekly. Available at: http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/178440/wars-crises-
global-economy-drive-oil-prices-in-history.html 
 
Lardic, S. and Mignon, V. (2006) Oil Prices and Economic Activity: An Asymmetric 
Cointegration Approach. Energy Economics. 34, pp.3910-3915 
 
Lombardi, M. J. and van Robays, I. (2011) Do Financial Investors Destabilize the Oil Price? 
European Central Bank, Ghent University, Working Paper no. 760. Available at: 
http://www.feb.ugent.be/nl/Ondz/wp/Papers/wp_11_760.pdf  
 
Luetkepohl, H. (2011) Vector Autoregressive Models. EUI Working Papers no.30, European 
University Institute, Florence. Available at: 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/19354/ECO_2011_30.pdf?sequence
=1  
 
Mendoza, O. and Vera, D. (2010) The Asymmetric Effects of Oil Shocks on an Oil-Exporting 
Economy. Cuaderos de Economia. 47(5), pp. 3-13. Available at: 
37 
http://www.jsg.utexas.edu/lacp/files/The-Asymmetric-Effects-of-Oil-Shocks-
On-an-Oil-Exporting-Economy.pdf  
 
Mehrara M., Oskoui K. N., (2007), The Sources of Macroeconomic Fluctuations in Oil 
Exporting Countries: A Comparative Study. Economic Modelling, 24 (3) pp. 
365-379. Available at: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999306001064   
 
Mork, K. A. (1989) Oil and the Macroeconomy When Prices Go Up and Down: An Extension 
of Hamilton’s Results. Journal of Political Economy. 97(3), pp.740-744.  
 
Mork, K.A., Olsen, Ø. and Mysen, H.T. (1994) Macroeconomic Responses to Oil Price 
Increases and Decreases in Seven OECD countries. The Energy Journal. 15(4), 
19-35.  
 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (2000) FAQs about OPEC. Vienna, 
Austria. Available at: http://www.eppo.go.th/inter/opec/OPEC-about.html  
 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (2014) Annual Statistical Bulletin 
2014 edition. Available at: 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publicatio
ns/ASB2014.pdf   
 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (2015) Member Countries. Available 
at: http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm  
 
Papapetrou, E. (2001) Oil Price Shocks, Stock Market, Economic Activity and Employment 
in Greece. Energy Economics. 23(5), pp. 511-532.  
 
Pindyck, R.S. (1991), Irreversibility, Uncertainty and Investment. Journal of Economic 
Literature. 29, pp. 1110-1148.  
 
Rentschler, J. E. (2013) Oil Price Volatility, Economic Growth and the Hedging Role of 
Renewable Energy, Policy Research Working Paper no. 6603, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. Available at: http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/09/16/
000158349_20130916160608/Rendered/PDF/WPS6603.pdf  
 
Sims, C.A. (1980) Macroeconomics and Reality. Econometrica. 48, pp.1-48 
 
Verbeek, M. (2008) A Guide to Modern Econometrics, 3rd Edition, John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 
Netherlands: Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
 
Yan, L. (2012) Analysis of the International Oil Price Fluctuations and its Influencing 
Factors. American Journal of Industrial and Business Management. 2(2), pp.39-
46. 
 
Zhang, Y. B. (2008) Analysis of Influencing Factors of International Oil Price. Chinese 
Petroleum Enterprise. 3, p.96.  
38 
Data   
 
The Bureau Labor Statistics (BLS, 2015) Washington DC: United States Labor Department. 
Available at: http://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet  
 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) (2015). Washington DC: International Monetary 
Fund.  
 
The International Statistical Institute (ISI) (2015). Rio de Janeiro: The International 
Statistical Institute. Available from: http://www.isi-
web.org/component/content/article/5-root/root/81-developing  
 
World Development Indicators (WDI) (2015). Washington DC: the World Bank.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
39 
Appendix 
 
Table 5.1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, differentiated logged real world oil price 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LRWOP) has a unit root (ADF-test) 
 
  t-Statistic Prob*. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics  -6.1589 0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level -2.6369  
 5% level -1.9513  
 10% level -1.6107  
 *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values 
 
 
Table 5.2: Im, Pesaran and Shin test, differentiated logged real GDP 
 
Null Hypothesis: each series in the panel has a unit root (IPS test) 
 
OPEC  Statistic Prob. 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  8.113 0.0000 
    
Cross section Average t-Stat  -4.3144*  
    
Non-OPEC    
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -653238 0.0000 
    
Cross section Average t-Stat  -4.2249*  
* Same critical t-stat as in table 5.1. 
 
 
 
Table 5.5: Vector Autoregression (VAR) Estimates, time span 1980-2013 
                        
 
 Non-OPEC: 1980-2013 OPEC: 1980-2013 
 DLRGDP DLRWOP DLRGDP DLRWOP 
DLRGDP (-1) -0.0199 0.1229 0.2402 0.0469 
t-statistics -0.316 1.5624 2.7592 0.3625 
     
DLRGDP (-2) 0.0879 0.1071 0.0684 0.109 
t-statistics 1.3785 1.3434 0.836 0.8959 
     
DLRWOP (-1) 0.1119 -0.1502 0.0319 -0.1055 
t-statistics 2.2262 -2.3904 0.5344 -1.1884 
     
DLRWOP (-2) 0.0466 -0.1195 -0.0277 -0.1791 
t-statistics 0.9349 -1.9154 -0.04866 -2.1196 
     
R
2 0.0318 0.088 
40 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.6: Granger causality 1980-2008 
 
Null Hypothesis Prob 
DLRGDPOPEC does not granger cause Oil price shocks 0.01 
Oil price shocks does not granger cause DLRGDPOPEC 0.0157 
  
DLRGDPnon-OPEC does not granger cause Oil price shocks 0.0582 
Oil price shocks does not granger cause DLRGDPnon-OPEC 0.0191 
 
 
 
Table 5.7: Variance Decomposition of Oil price shocks: OPEC (1980-2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.8: Variance Decomposition of Oil price shocks: non-OPEC (1980-2008) 
 
                                                                                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period DLRGDP 
1 0.0000 % 
2 2.8219 % 
3 2.8889 % 
4 2.8809 % 
5 2.8863 % 
6 2.8874 % 
Period DLRGDP 
1 0.0000 % 
2 2.8134 % 
3 2.6813 % 
4 2.6450 % 
5 2.6358 % 
6 2.6318 % 
